In the popular science literature and artistic works it is mentioned that during the Second World War, British intelligence intercepted a secret message about the preparatory attack on a large city, but the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom abandoned the evacuation to hide the fact of decryption. We checked whether this story is true.

Bombing Coventry On the night of November 14-5, 1940, she became one of the most destructive attacks by the Luftwaffe on the UK during the Second World War. As a result of the bombing, which lasted about ten hours, the central part of the city received a severe blow: more than 4,300 buildings were destroyed, including an old cathedral. According to various estimates, from 380 to 554 people died, hundreds of more were seriously injured.

Since the 1970s, the version has been distributed that the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was in advance of this attack by intelligence, which deciphered the German message, but did not give an order to evacuate the Coventry. Thus, the head of the government allegedly hoped to hide the fact of decryption from the opponent and get the opportunity to continue to learn about his plans.

Subsequently, this story was reflected in mass culture: Robert Harris's novel "Enigma"(Written in 1985, Awritten in 2001), the play of a native of Coventry Alan Pololoka "Night in November"(First set in 2008) and the series"Sherlock"(However, the protagonist performed by Benedict Cumberbatch admits that it may not be true). The assertion that Churchill deliberately sacrificed Coventry is also given in the publications of Russian -speaking Internet portals And Media.

The fact that Churchill knew about the upcoming attack on Coventry, but refused to prevent it or at least minimize the consequences, was one of the first to say an officer of British military intelligence Frederick Winterbotam. During the Second World War, he, together with his colleagues, led the cipher’s hacking program used by the German army and the transfer of information received by the British command. Super -secret information deciphered in this way They began to call The Ultra code, this concept is used by the intelligence of Great Britain and its allies to this day.

In 1974, Winterbotam published a book "Secret Ultra", In which he claimed: Churchill reported that the purpose of the next mass raid of German aviation would be Koventry, at about 15:00 on November 14, about four hours before the start of the bombing. However, the Prime Minister did not order either to evacuate people or take special measures to protect the city so as not to compromise the source of important information. Winterbotam appreciated this decision as “terrible”, but “certainly correct”. Note that, working on the book, the scout could not use the still classified archival documents and He was forced rely only in memory.

The unjustified categorical and even the fallacy of the statements of Winterbotam and its like-minded people were demonstrated back in the 1980s when they were Medicked The texts of the reports of Churchill from the Ministry of Air Force. In the report of November 12, on the basis of partial decoding as possible goals of the upcoming German operation, Lunar Sonata, five areas were mentioned, and there were no Coventry among them. As a possible facility of an imminent powerful bombardment, this city (along with Birmingham) was mentioned by a German military pilot, which was captured on November 9. But intelligence reacted skeptically to his information, continuing to consider the most likely goal of the London attack and the surroundings. In response to the upcoming bombardment, the British Air Force prepared the Cold Water plan. It included measures to suppress the German navigation radio beacons X-Gerät (“Devices X” - German), as well as air patrolling of German air base and response bombing of German airfields and cities. When at about 13:00 on November 14, the activation of the X-Gerät operation became noticeable, the Operation Cold Water was put into action. Apparently, after about two hours, thanks to the interceptions of German diaperic signals, it became clear that they were intersecting in the Coventry area (this is the statements of Winterbotam Confirmed report of the head of the British air defense of Stevenson of November 17).

By message One of the secretaries of Churchill, when the Prime Minister on the daytime on November 14 was going to leave the residence on Dauning Street to the suburban estate in Oxfordshire, he received a completely secret report from the head of the secret intelligence service. After reading it on the road, Churchill ordered the driver to return. Based on the words of the Prime Minister and evidence of eyewitnesses, historians conclude that Churchill was confident in the inevitable attack on London in the next night. He sent personal secretaries and engineers from a residence to Dauning Street to safer places, and for a long time he was on the roof of the Ministry of Air Force, impatiently waiting for a raid, which did not begin that night.

On the other hand, historian Frederick Taylor in recent book “Coventry: November 14, 1940”, having analyzed a number of evidence and memories, comes to the conclusion: most likely, in the secret report that Churchill received, it was said that the attack would not be committed on London, but to another place, although Coventry was not necessarily indicated. According to Taylor, which is why the Prime Minister canceled the departure from the capital. As for the lack of measures for the evacuation of the inhabitants of Coventry, the historian notes that in Europe at that time there were no examples of such actions, and at the then level of communications, it was simply impossible to organize a large (about 250,000 residents) of the city in a matter of hours. Moreover, the announcement of the raid would create a panic and made it difficult to arrive in the city of additional forces of fire and civil defense.

There is also no evidence that Churchill neglected measures to defend Coventry. Since this large industrial center was previously bombarded, on November 7, the Prime Minister ordered to strengthen the air defense there. There is evidence that the British authorities - as soon as on November 14, it became clear that the goal of the attack would be Coventry - began the implementation of all measures in advance for this case. However, not all of them turned out to be effective-for example, the X-Gerät signals plan completely failed due to the incorrectly selected modulation frequency.

As a result, Taylor calls The idea of the “sacrifice” by Coventry with a city legend. In his opinion, there is no reason to believe that Churchill himself or, in general, the British authorities deliberately decided to neglect the protection of the city in order to keep the fact of deciphering German messages secretly. But at that moment, the government, in principle, had no resources to prevent the attack or significantly soften its consequences.

Photo on the cover: The Imperial War Museums Via Wikimedia Commons